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Abstract 
Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. A number of 
philosophers have recently called the propositionalist thesis into question. It has been argued, 
successfully I believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a 
propositional content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-
propositional attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. In light of this, Neil Sinhababu’s 
(2015) recent attack on anti-propositionalists is noteworthy. The present paper aims to sharpen 
his worries and show that they fail for a range of reasons. Besides merely offering a reply, 
considering his challenges provides an opportunity to add clarity to this emerging area of 
research and it allows one to strengthen the case against propositionalism more generally. 
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1. Introduction 
 Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. So, 
according to propositionalists, when it is true that one, say, likes Sally or loves the dog in the 
corner, it is true because one is in a state with a propositional content – perhaps by liking that 
Sally is nice, loving that the dog in the corner is well behaved, or by having some appropriate set 
of beliefs and desires with appropriate propositional contents. A number of philosophers have 
recently called the propositionalist thesis into question.1 It has been argued, successfully I 
believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a propositional 
content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-propositional 
attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. Moreover, positive accounts of such attitudes have 
now been offered2 and non-propositional attitudes are being utilized in fruitful ways in the 
philosophy of mind.3 In light of this, Neil Sinhababu’s (2015) recent attack on anti-
propositionalists is noteworthy. He argues that anti-propositionalists fail to properly individuate 
various mental states and he calls the very existence of non-propositional attitudes into question 
by arguing that they can’t play the roles required of them in our psychological explanations. 
Considering his challenges provides an opportunity to add clarity to this emerging area of 
research and it allows one to strengthen the case against propositionalism. 
 The present paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain Sinhababu’s two criticisms. 
Second, I pressure the motivations for his criticisms by clarifying the anti-propositionalist 
position and I show that both of his criticisms depend on an ability to capture apparently non-
propositional facts in propositionalist-friendly terms. Third, I argue that Sinhababu’s strategy 
for capturing the non-propositional facts systematically fails. Fourth, I briefly consider how 
                                                 
1 See Ben-Yami (1997), Brewer (2006), Crane (2001), Grzankowski (2012), Merricks (2009), Montague 
(2007), and Thagard (2006). 
2 See Grzankowski (2013, 2014). 
3 For example, see Bengson, Grube, and Korman (2011), Bengson and Moffett (2011), and Mendelovici 
(2013). 
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propositionalists might avoid the systematic problem I level again Sinhababu but argue that 
propositionalism would still remain unmotivated and would continue to face difficult 
challenges. 
These points constitute two important advances for anti-propositionalists in the broader 
dialectic, points that should be of wider interest. First, in the existing literature, 
propositionalists have been given a number of difficult cases and they have been asked to offer 
analyses or other reductive treatments of apparently non-propositional attitudes. One important 
way of doing so (and it is in fact Sinhababu’s way) is to hold that ascriptions of apparently non-
propositional attitudes are elliptical for propositional attitude ascriptions.4 Rather than waiting 
for the next clever, propositionalist move on this front, I argue that any such propositionalist 
treatment will face the problem of overprediction that I level against Sinhababu and that the 
most natural retreat is unpromising. Second, arguments in favor of propositionalism are hard to 
find in the literature. Sinhababu’s paper is important in large part because it constitutes an 
attempt to explicitly motivate a position that is often tacitly accepted. My clarifications of the 
anti-propositionalist position and my discussion of Sinhababu’s motivations show that 
propositionalists have little to fear from the expansive theory of mind anti-propositionalists are 
offering. 
 
2. Sinhababu’s Criticisms 
 Non-propositional attitudes feature in common psychological explanations. For 
instance: The reason that I’m not going to the party tonight is that I believe only gin will be 
served and I hate gin. Lex Luthor avoids the Fortress of Solitude because he suspects Superman 
                                                 
4 Similar attempts can be found in Larson et. al. (1997), Quine (1956), and Searle (1983). Quine’s position 
is couched in terms of regimentations of English into first-order logic rather than hidden linguistic 
material, but the upshot is roughly the same and open the same criticism leveled against Sinhababu. 
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is there and he fears Superman. Bill wants to go to the bar because he heard John will be there 
and Bill loves John. John wants to go to the bar too, but it’s because he heard that Bill will be 
there and he hates Bill – he needs to have a word with him. Propositionalists aim to render the 
intentional aspects of such psychological explanations in terms of propositional attitudes only – 
although liking, fearing, loving, and hating might appear to be non-propositional attitudes (our 
ascriptions of them feature noun phrase grammatical objects rather than complement clauses), 
looks are deceiving. 
 Sinhababu wishes to defend propositionalism. He argues that once we appreciate the 
demands of a psychological theory, we will see that propositionalism has advantages that make 
it too good to be false. Moreover, one gets the sense from Sinhababu’s criticisms that there is 
simply no place in a complete and final theory of mind for non-propositional attitudes – they 
are left looking as if they do no work. In short, upon careful philosophical examination, we will 
see that there are no non-propositional attitudes. 
 The core of Sinhababu’s criticisms has it that anti-propositionalists cannot individuate 
attitudes finely enough and that for this reason we must hold that the attitudes that appear to be 
non-propositional are in fact propositional. He brings to bear two kinds of considerations in 
support of this worry. First, he argues that anti-propositionalism fails to capture some simple 
inferential patterns that propositionalists easily capture. Second, he argues that anti-
propositionalists cannot provide simple explanations of behavior, action, and motivation. In 
turn, let’s consider these points and how they speak to the worry that, whereas propositionalists 
individuate mental states correctly, anti-propositionalists don’t individuate them finely enough. 
 Starting with inferential patterns, consider a pair of subjects who we are inclined to say 
desire Johnny Depp. Suppose we are inclined to hold that ‘Jenny desires Depp’ and ‘Charles 
desires Depp’ are both true. It certainly seems to follow that ‘Jenny and Charles desire the same 
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thing’ is true too. But Sinhababu believes that this is a bad inference and he provides a putative 
counterexample. Suppose that Charles is a cannibal who would be satisfied only in situations in 
which he eats Depp but not in situations were he merely chats with him. Jenny, on the other 
hand, is a big fan of Depp and she would be satisfied in situations in which she spends the 
afternoon talking to Depp. Sinhababu’s claim is that we would be reluctant to maintain that 
Charles and Jenny desire the same thing, but anti-propositionalists seem committed to the view 
that they do. Propositionalists, on the other hand, are in a position to make finer distinctions 
between desires. A propositionalist would have it that a complete description of our subjects’ 
desires are as follows: ‘Jenny desires that she talk with Depp’ and ‘Charles desires that he eat 
Depp’.5 Whereas propositionalists can block the inference to the conclusion ‘Charles and Jenny 
desire the same thing,’ Sinhababu holds that anti-propositionalists cannot. Since we do not wish 
to say ‘Jenny and Charles desire the same thing’ even when we wish to say ‘Jenny desires Depp’ 
and ‘Charles desires Depp’ things must be more complicated than they appear to be on the 
surface. Since propositionalists can easily capture the inferential patters, an attractive fleshing 
out of the underlying complication is that Charles and Jenny are, despite appearances, really 
said to have propositional desires. 
                                                 
5 This actually isn’t quite right, since it might be that Jenny wouldn’t be satisfied if Depp were mean to her 
while they were chatting and Charles might not be satisfied if he ate Depp covered in wasabi. Specifying 
the content of a desire is harder than one might think and this is a real problem for propositionalists 
(though not a problem that favors anti-propositionalism, rather, it is a shared problem). Interestingly, the 
resources propositionalists utilize in overcoming this problem may well be available to non-
propositionalists too. For instance, suppose that propositionalists suggest dealing with the wasabi case by 
appealing to other mental states of Charles’s – perhaps other (propositional) desires of his. There is no 
reason anti-propositionalists couldn’t do the same when (and if) they face problems of underspecification. 
As noted below in the main text, anti-propositionalists needn’t deny that there are propositional attitudes. 
Thanks to Neil Sinhababu for pressing the underspecification worry in conversation. See Fara (2013) and 
Braun (2015) for a discussion of the underspecification of desire attributions. 
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 Turn now to claim that anti-propositionalists cannot provide simple explanations of 
behavior, action, and motivation.  Suppose we are inclined to hold that Jenny desires chocolate, 
desires a diamond necklace, desires a goldfish, and desires Johnny Depp. Sinhababu holds that 
by ascribing such states, we miss distinctions that we need to make if we are going to make sense 
of Jenny’s behavior. In particular, understanding when Jenny will be satisfied and how she will 
be motivated demands finer grained distinctions. Suppose Jenny would be satisfied in situations 
in which she eats chocolate, talks with Johnny Depp, wears a necklace, and owns a goldfish. 
Further, suppose Jenny would be motivated to meet Depp, visit a pet shop, put on a necklace, 
and eat some chocolate. It’s plausible (or at least possible) that she wouldn’t be satisfied if she 
were given a goldfish to wear or had Depp to eat. She wouldn’t be motivated to eat a goldfish or 
put some chocolate on her face. Construing her desires non-propositionally doesn’t allow us to 
draw these differences in motivation and satisfaction. Sinhababu worries that anti-
propositionalists can only tell us which objects Jenny desires, but in order to explain her 
behavior and understand her actions, we need to know more. Sinhababu concludes that since we 
do in fact successfully predict and explain behavior in many situations, when we look to be 
ascribing non-propositional attitudes, there is really more to the story. Once again, 
propositionalists, with their finer grained distinctions, seem better positioned than anti-
propositionalists and so we have reason for thinking that, appearances not withstanding, our 
explanations of behavior are really propositional attitude explanations. 
 Sinhababu argues that similar points to those just offered for desire apply to liking and 
fearing. For instance, he tells us: ‘[P]eople who like different aspects of chocolate shouldn't be 
regarded as liking the same thing. If Tim likes to taste chocolate and Lou likes to look upon its 
smooth brown surface, Tim and Lou like different things. We wouldn't describe them as liking 
the same thing, or as sharing each other's likings’ (12). In cases of fearing, we might want to 
distinguish between someone whose level of fright increases as he gets closer to a snake and 
someone else whose fright increases as he watches a snake eat a mouse. If we simply say they 
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both fear the snake, we can’t account for a clear difference in motivation. Rather, we must seek 
finer grained distinctions. We should say that one fears being near snakes while the other fears 
that the snake will eat the mouse. Similar considerations apply to loving and hating and 
presumably, if Sinhababu is correct, to any other candidate non-propositional attitude. 
 These criticisms of anti-propositionalism can be dealt with. Moreover, working through 
them provides an opportunity to clarify and strengthen the position. 
 
3. Replies 
3.1 The Scope of Anti-Propositionalism 
 Some points of clarification are in order. In defending anti-propositionalists, I want to 
focus on fearing, liking, loving, and hating rather than on desiring since I think they are better 
candidates for having non-propositional instances. Although some anti-propositonalists argue 
that there are desires that aren’t propositional, I think this may well be a mistake. If the 
definitive role of desire is to motivate and/or determine when subjects will be satisfied, I think 
we will always need propositional desires, just as Sinhababu holds. (Whether that is indeed the 
definitive role of desire ought to be questioned, but presently I’ll put that to one side.) 
Furthermore, there is good linguistic evidence that ascriptions that appear to ascribe non-
propositional desires are in fact concealed propositional ascriptions (more on this below).7 But 
the considerations that make it attractive to take desire to be a propositional attitude in all 
instances do not extend to many other cases. Liking, loving, fearing, and hating constitute far 
more promising candidates for having non-propositional instances and so I think it is there that 
anti-propositionalists should plant their flag. 
 Drawing this difference between desiring and, say, fearing or liking brings out a very 
important dialectical point. Anti-propositionalists do not think that there fail to be propositional 
                                                 
7 See Forbes (2006), Larson et. al. (1997), and Searle (1983). 
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attitudes – belief and desire are great candidates. In fact, not only do anti-propositionalists 
think there are propositional attitudes such as belief and desire, they think there are both 
propositional and non-propositional instances of mental states such as fearing, liking, loving, 
and hating. I might like Sally and I might like that Sally is in town this week. I might fear Rover 
and I might fear that Rover has been harmed. The key anti-propositionalist claim is simply that 
some attitudes fail to be propositional. In the face of a long tradition of theorizing about 
propositional attitudes almost exclusively, this is a bold thesis, even without desire on the table. 
 Sinhababu’s criticisms center on the thought that anti-propositionalists lack the 
resources to make distinctions where distinctions are needed. But once it is seen that anti-
propositionalists wish to expand the resources of a theory of mind rather than constrict it, 
Sinhababu’s criticisms look far less threatening. Anti-propositionalists can and should agree to 
much of what Sinhababu says. There are indeed cases where propositional contents are called 
for. But this in no way shows that we don’t need non-propositional attitudes too. In wondering, 
for example, why one subject but not another undergoes occurrent episodes of fear in the face of 
snakes, we might note that the first fears snakes but the other does not. Perhaps the other likes 
snakes. (More on explanations like this below.) At the moment, I wish to make a quite modest 
but important point: when Sinhababu provides cases that appear to demand appeal to 
propositional attitudes in order to make finer grained distinctions, anti-propositionalists 
needn’t be threatened since they should agree that there are propositional instances of fearing, 
liking, loving, and so on. It’s hard to see how offering cases that call for propositional attitudes 
pose a problem for a theorist with all of Sinhababu’s resources and more still. What Sinhababu 
needs to show is not that we need propositional attitudes (everyone should agree to that), but 
that the expanded theory is superfluous or problematic or perhaps both. Sinhababu himself isn’t 
sufficiently clear on this front, but let us proceed with the above clarifications in mind so that we 
can strengthen the propositionalists’ case. 
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 Return to Sinhababu’s two lines of attack – worries about inferential patterns and 
worries about predicting behavior and motivation. Sinhababu could take the above clarifications 
to heart and recognize that anti-propositionalists hold that only some attitudes fail to be 
propositional, but he might then argue (i) that the inferences predicted by anti-propositionalists 
are incorrect, so the ontological expansion is problematic and (ii) that unless we are told what 
work the non-propositional attitudes are doing with respect to our explanations of behavior and 
action, they look like idle posits. But even these sharpened challenges can be met. In sections 3.2 
and 3.3 I will show that both objections rest on the same unpaid debt. In section 3.4, I will show 
that the debt cannot be paid.  
 
3.2 The Inferential Worry 
 For the inferential worry to get a hold, it must be the case that inferences such as the 
following are bad inferences: 
A. Jenny likes Depp. 
B. Charles likes Depp. 
C. So, Jenny and Charles like the same thing. 
It is not at all obvious to me that this is a bad inference. How could it be? We are offered two 
relational truths with a shared relatum and our inferential pattern is simple existential 
generalization. So one immediate reply to Sinhababu is that the inference is a perfectly good 
one.8 But suppose one also feels the pull of Sinhababu’s intuition about the inference. Anti-
propositionalists can give an explanation of why we might have that intuition, that is, the 
intuition that Jenny, the fan, and Charles, the cannibal, fail to like the same thing. As ontological 
expansionists, anti-propositionalists have an easy answer. There are, as noted, both 
                                                 
8 Thank you to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this point. The referee also helpfully points 
out that if the conclusion were ‘Jenny and Charles both like Depp’ it looks even harder to follow 
Sinhababu. 
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propositional and non-propositional instances of liking. If a situation draws our attention to 
propositional instances and the situation further supports the view that two subjects have 
likings with different propositional contents, then we may be tempted to say that our two 
subjects do not like the same thing. So, there is a perfectly good sense in which our subjects do 
not like the same thing but also a sense in which they do.9 All of this is easily made sense of if 
there are both propositional and non-propositional attitudes, so as expansionists, anti-
propositionalists face no deep problem here and indeed have an advantage since they can make 
good on the very tempting claim that of course the inference is valid. 
 To get its bite back, the inferential worry seems to require that there is no good inference 
in the offing. One could so argue by holding that sentences A and B, despite appearances, are not 
the simple relational ascriptions they appear to be. This would show that what looks to be an 
obviously good inference isn’t. This is indeed Sinhababu’s position. He believes that any time we 
ascribe what look to be non-propositional attitudes, we must be speaking elliptically: 
It’s best to understand objectual desire attributions as a shorthand for 
propositional desire attributions. We use them for economy of expression when 
our audience has enough background knowledge to know which propositional 
content we mean. When our audience wouldn't fill out the rest of the attitude 
ascription correctly, we use propositional desire attributions. As Lewis suggests, 
‘the objects of our attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of 
speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse’ (514).10 While 
it'd be nice to have a formula for translating any objectual attitude attribution 
into propositional form, I can't offer one here. Knowing whether someone who 
desires Johnny Depp desires that they eat him, make love to him, hire him, or 
keep him in an aquarium requires background information about the desirer. The 
best I can say is that desiring x is desiring that some x-involving state of affairs 
obtain (9). 
I might say ‘Charles wants Depp’ when I know full well that what he wants is to eat Depp or I 
might say ‘Jenny likes Charles’ when I know full well that Jenny likes to talk to Charles. If 
Sinhababu is correct, an inference like that given in A-C is only a good instance of existential 
                                                 
9 As King (2002) argues, there is in fact linguistic evidence to support that claim that there are two senses 
of verbs such as ‘to like’.  
10
 Sinhababu here cites Lewis (1979). 
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generalization when the elided material is the same. When we speak elliptically, very often it will 
not be and, in exactly those situations, anti-propositionalists will make faulty predictions of 
validity. It is crucial, then, that Sinhababu support the claim that sentences such as A-C don’t 
wear their logical form on their sleeves. Let us note this debt and return to it in section 3.4. As 
we will see, this very same debt arises yet again in the next section. 
 
3.3 The Worry About Behavior and Action 
 As we saw above, anti-propositionalists have at their disposal both non-propositional 
and propositional attitudes. Anything propositionalists can explain about action and behavior, 
anti-propositionalists can explain too. But might non-propositional attitudes be idle posits? I’ll 
offer some cases where apparently non-propositional attitudes feature in explanations of 
behavior and action and so seem to do some important work, just as important as any 
propositional attitudes. This places a burden on the propositionalist to make sense of such non-
propositional explanations in propositional attitude terms. As we will see, this gives way to an 
owed debt, the very same debt facing Sinhababu in the previous section. 
 Non-propositional attitudes regularly feature in psychological explanations. At the outset 
of the paper I gave a series of explanations that featured apparent ascriptions of non-
propositional attitudes. Repeated here: the reason that I’m not going to the party tonight is that 
I believe only gin will be served and I hate gin. Lex Luthor avoids the Fortress of Solitude 
because he suspects Superman is there and he fears Superman. Bill wants to go to the bar 
because he heard John will be there and Bill loves John. John wants to go to the bar too, but it’s 
because he heard that Bill will be there and he hates Bill – he needs to have a word with him. 
Here are a few more simple examples. The reason I want to be far away from Jones is that I fear 
him. Sam wants to be far away from Jones as well, but it is because he dislikes Jones. We both 
want the same thing – to be away from Jones – but the reason I want what I want is different 
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from Sam’s reason. In fact, we often cite non-propositional attitudes when we want to explain 
certain desires. I want my brother to be happy because I love him, I want the pain in my leg to 
cease because I don't like the feeling of pain, and, as noted, I want to be far away from Jones 
because I fear him. Notice that the reasons given for these desires come in the form of 
ascriptions of further mental states, mental states ascribed in such a way that they aren’t 
obviously propositional attitudes. Importantly, these are pretty typical psychological 
explanations that, like any other  psychological explanations, allow us to explain and predict 
what agents are up to and why. 
 Returning to Sinhababu, the most charitable reading of his criticisms has it that anti-
propositionalists face the challenge of saying what good non-propositional attitudes are. The 
answer is plain. Along with propositional attitudes, they feature in predictive psychological 
explanations. 
 Now, of course, a propositionalist should push back at this juncture by arguing that 
appearances are deceiving – what look to be non-propositional explanations are really 
propositional explanations in disguise. And as we saw above, this is precisely Sinhababu’s 
position. The explanations just offered, according to Sinhababu, are elliptical. In a moment I’ll 
offer reasons for thinking that propositionalists will run into systematic trouble here, but before 
doing so, it is worth asking exactly what the motivation for this move is supposed to be.  
 When I say that I want my brother to be happy because I love him, must I have spoken 
elliptically? Must there be something I love about him such that, on this basis, I want him to be 
happy? I needn’t love that he is/be happy in order to love him. To love him I needn’t love that he 
is kind or funny or witty or … . Nevertheless, I can still love him and on that basis want him to be 
happy. The explanation of why I want my brother to be happy isn’t obviously lacking. Why, then, 
must we look around for a propositional completion? The fact that Sinhababu has given us some 
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cases where we can and perhaps should find a propositional content hardly shows that in all 
cases we must. 
 But I’m willing to give this point away – let’s suppose there is some prima facie 
motivation that would extend to all psychological explanations. Propositionalists must still show 
us that there is some way of, as Sinhababu says, ‘translating any objectual attitude attribution 
into propositional form’ (9). Sinhababu notes that he doesn’t have a formula for doing so, but he 
clearly thinks that if we proceed case by case we should (at least in principle) succeed. This is an 
absolutely key move for propositionalists since it is clear that we ascribe what look to be hard 
working, non-propositional attitudes when offering perfectly acceptable psychological 
explanations. In the existing literature, it has been argued that propositionalists face some very 
hard cases,11 but I want to do better than pass the burden back to them, ever waiting for a clever 
propositionalist translation. I will show that there are cases in which any propositional 
translation of a non-propositional ascription faces systematic problems. 
 
3.4 Predicting Too Much 
 The propositionalist view predicts too much by making possible readings of attitude 
ascriptions available that shouldn’t be. This shows that the proposed propositional attitude 
sentences cannot be equivalent to the non-propositional attitude target sentences. 
 Quine (1956) drew attention to a distinction between specific and non-specific readings 
of sentences such as ‘Sally wants a sloop’ and ‘Jones seeks a car’.12 On specific readings, there is 
a specific sloop Sally wants (the HMS Resolution, say) and a particular car Jones seeks (Sally’s 
Econoline, perhaps). On non-specific readings, there isn’t a specific car or particular sloop at 
issue. As Quine helpfully puts it, Sally simply wants ‘to be relieved of slooplessness’. 
                                                 
11 See especially Ben-Yami (1997), Grzankowski (2012), Merricks (2009), and Montague (2007). 
12 Quine uses the terms ‘relational’ and ‘notional’, though much of the literature has adopted the 
terminology of the main text, which I think is clearer. See Bonomi (1995) for reasons for thinking this 
distinction isn’t simply the ‘de re’/‘de dicto’ distinction. Bonomi’s discussion furthers the thought that 
‘relational’/‘notional’ isn’t the best way to label the distinction. 
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Interestingly, not all attitude verbs admit of this distinction – a point supported in the literature 
on intensional transitive verbs.13 For example, the following are said to have only specific 
readings: 
  1. Bill fears a man. 
  2. Jones loves a woman. 
  3. Sally is thinking of a number. 
Whereas one can want a sloop but no sloop in particular,14 it is odd if not nonsense to say that 
one can fear, say, a man but no man in particular or that one can think of a number but no 
specific number. I might want a horse without wanting any particular horse, but it seems that if 
I hate a horse, there must be a particular one I hate. Matters seem no different if we change the 
quantifier. ‘Sally is thinking of three numbers’ seems to have only the specific reading and the 
same goes for ‘John likes exactly two cities’. 
 To avoid confusion, it is worth noting that such sentences do have a generic or habitual 
reading. ‘Bill likes a good cheese’ seems to have a reading that is roughly equivalent to 
something like, ‘In general, if one were to present Bill with some good cheese, he would like it’. 
But this is not quite the same phenomenon we saw with, for example, wanting a sloop – the 
generic and the non-specific are not one and the same. Here is a way to see that there is a 
difference. Take, ‘Jones loves a good bottle of wine’. There needn’t be some specific bottle that 
we are talking about, but this seems to be due to the fact that we are quantifying in some generic 
way over temporal episodes that might involve distinct bottles. (Such a reading is especially 
                                                 
13 See especially Hallman (2004). See Forbes (2006) and Larson et. al. (1997) for further discussion. 
14 Recall from above that I noted there are linguistic reasons favoring propositionalism about 
wanting/desiring. Here is one such reason: ‘Sally will want a car tomorrow’ is ambiguous between a 
description of a case in which Sally has a desire for a car tomorrow (though neutral on when the desire 
arises), and a case in which, sometime tomorrow, the desire for a car first arises. One obvious way to make 
sense of this ambiguity is to posit hidden structure involving ‘to have’: ‘Sally will want [to have] a car 
tomorrow’. With this additional structure, we can now capture the ambiguity in terms of verb 
modification. On one reading ‘tomorrow’ modifies ‘to have’ and on the other, ‘to want’. Larson et. al. 
(1997) and Searle (1983) have used facts like these to argue that even when they appear otherwise, 
wants/desires-ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional attitudes. Such motivations do not extend to 
liking, loving, fearing, and hating. 
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salient in ‘Jones loves a good bottle of wine on Wednesday nights)’.15 But if we focus attention on 
a particular, one-off mental episode of Jones’s, ‘Jones loves a bottle of wine’ is true just in case 
there is a particular bottle he loves. This is evidenced by the fact that we can reasonably ask 
‘which one?’. Not so for the non-specific reading of ‘Sally wants a sloop’. We can focus attention 
on a particular mental episode at a particular, one-off time and still generate a non-specific 
reading. This is highlighted by noticing that asking ‘which one?’ would be misguided when Sally 
simply wants to be relieved of, say, slooplessness. Unfortunately for the propositionalist, this 
prediction concerning a lack of non-specific readings for mental verbs such as ‘to love’, ‘to like’, 
‘to fear’, and so on is missed, for sentential complements seem to always allow for non-specific 
readings – non-specific readings are over-predicted.16 For example, 4-6 all seem perfectly 
felicitous: 
4. Jones fears that a disease will kill him, though there is no particular disease 
Jones has in mind. 
5. Sam hates that exactly three horses (though none in particular) crossed the 
finish line. 
6. Sally loves that a student brought her the apple, though there is no specific 
student such that she loves that he or she brought the apple.17 
But now suppose that a theorist like Sinhababu is correct, that sentences such as ‘Jones fears a 
disease’ and ‘Sam hates exactly three horses’ have translations into propositional attitude 
sentences. My hypothesis is that for any sentential completion that the propositionalist offers, a 
non-specific reading that isn’t supposed to be available will become available. Only working 
through every case could confirm this claim, but a few more examples should make it 
                                                 
15 For more on generics see Leslie (2008) and Liebesman (2011). 
16 Further reason for propositionalism about desire. Desire ascriptions do allow for non-specific readings 
and propositional complements retain this. 
17 Imagine that Jones simply has a general fear of contracting a disease, Sam made a bet that she would 
only lose if any three horses finished, and Sally is just happy to be shown some appreciation by the 
students for a change. 
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exceedingly plausible, so let’s add 7-11 to the data found in 4-6. All of the following seem to have 
a non-specific reading: 
7. Smith fears that some papers have been lost. 
8. Mary fears that a car in her lot was damaged by the hail. 
9. Sally likes that at least five professors will be at the bar. 
10. Bill loves that a limo is available for the prom. 
11. Jones hates that a limo is available for the prom. 
Again, appealing to context to select the ‘correct’ sentential completion seems to be of no help. It 
may be, for example, that in some cases the propositionalist believes that ‘S likes a cat’ is to be 
translated into ‘S likes that a cat is friendly’ but in other cases it should be translated into ‘S likes 
that a cat is a good hunter’. But it’s a general feature of clausal complements featuring indefinite 
noun-phrases and many other quantified noun-phrases that they make room for non-specific 
readings and so yield inequivalent attitude ascriptions.18 
 
4. A Metaphysical Approach 
 One way that propositionalists might avoid the overprediction argument is to shift focus 
from a linguistic translation procedure to a metaphysical account. We have just seen that 
couching propositionalism in terms of sentences won’t work, but perhaps the view would fare 
better if put in terms of mental facts and a thesis of reduction or dependence. More generally, 
propositionalists might wish to argue that all non-propositional facts obtain in virtue of 
propositional attitude facts. In this final section, I want to say a bit about why this suggestion 
might be thought to fare better, how the above discussion pressures and constrains this strategy, 
                                                 
18 And notice that belief and desire attributions featuring indefinite noun-phrases open non-specific 
readings too, so trying to capture, say fearing or liking attributions in terms of, say, belief and/or desire 
attributions, isn’t going to help. 
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and why the strategy would be especially unhelpful for at least one of Sinhababu’s worries in 
particular. Finally, I’ll gesture towards a novel, systematic worry for this metaphysical approach. 
 To start, how might the metaphysical approach avoid the overprediction worry from 
section 3.4? The data from that section suggests that there are only specific instances of non-
propositional attitudes but there are both specific and non-specific instances of propositional 
attitudes. Although non-propositional attitude sentences can’t be treated in terms of 
propositional attitude sentences, a propositionalist might still maintain that non-propositional 
attitude facts obtain in virtue of specific propositional attitude facts. Not only would this move 
sidestep the worry raised in the last section, but it suggests a general strategy for 
propositionalists that looks more flexible and hence more promising than Sinhababu’s 
sentential approach. 
 Despite this possible improvement, metaphysical versions of propositionalism have been 
addressed in detail by Ben-Yami (1997), Grzankowski (2012), and Montague (2007). It has been 
argued that capturing non-propositional attitude facts in propositional attitude terms is at the 
very least very difficult, a point on which, as noted at the outside, I agree with. But the above 
discussion helps strengthen the anti-propositionalist case in two important ways: 
First, the treatments of non-propositional attitude facts that propositionalists offer must 
respect the specificity of the non-propositional attitudes discussed in the last section. The anti-
propositionalist strategy has been to offer, on behalf of propositionalists, ways propositionalists 
might account for non-propositional facts. Those ways have been found wanting but the 
resources given to propositionalists should be even more constrained than they have been – 
specificity must also be accounted for. 
Second, it is striking that propositionalism is not often argued for and so it is noteworthy 
that Sinhababu aims to offer positive reasons for adopting the position in the face of pressure 
from anti-propositionalists. If his arguments were persuasive, propositionalists should be 
motivated to meet the challenges posed by Ben-Yami, Grzankowski, and Montague. But we saw 
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above that once it is appreciated that anti-propositionalists are ontologically expansive rather 
than retractive, it is hard to see what anti-propositionalists can’t accomplish. Moreover, with the 
exception of a preference for parsimony,19 it’s hard to see how to motivate propositionalism in 
any form. So another way the above discussion interfaces with the metaphysical approach to 
propositionalism is by pressuring the motivations for the view in the first place. 
It is also worth pointing out that the metaphysical approach to propositionalism would 
undermine Sinhababu’s argument about inferential patterns. Sinhababu’s argument has it that 
C should not follow from A and B: 
A. Jenny likes Depp. 
B. Charles likes Depp. 
C. So, Jenny and Charles like the same thing. 
As we saw above, if he were correct that these sentences actually had hidden syntactic material 
or expressed propositions that are more complex than their surface form lets on, this might be a 
sustainable position – what look to be simple, two place relations would be structurally more 
complicated. But on the metaphysical account under question, there are non-propositional 
facts, the fact that Jenny likes Depp and the fact that Charles likes Depp. But from those two 
facts (even if they depend on other facts) it simply does follow that Jenny and Charles like the 
same thing.21 I don’t think this is a serious concern for the metaphysical approach to 
propositionalism in general, but it is worth noting that if it is pursued, one of Sinhababu’s tactics 
can’t get off the ground. 
                                                 
19 And it is worth saying a bit more about parsimony. Parsimony may indeed be a virtue, but appealing to 
parsimony gets a grip only when we have competing theories that purport to explain or capture certain 
data. We saw above that there are psychological explanations that make appeal to non-propositional 
attitudes. Unless propositionalists wish to deny that data outright, they must offer some treatment of the 
non-propositional attitude facts in terms of propositional attitude facts. Sinhababu’s approach won’t work 
and the upshot of the work of Ben-Yami, Grzankowski, and Montague is that the forthcoming strategies 
aren’t looking promising. In the present dialectic, a desire for parsimony at best serves as motivation to 
meet the challenges posed, but theory weighing isn’t yet on the table. 
21 Again, thank you to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. See footnote 8 above as well. 
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Finally, I want to gesture at another way of pressuring propositionalists systematically. 
We saw above that, contra Sinhababu, non-propositional attitudes feature in our folk-
psychological explanations. I might explain why I want to see Bill by citing that I love Bill, for 
example. Propositionalists face an unappreciated challenge here. 
To illustrate, focus on fearing things. Let’s consider a couple attractive propositionalist 
attempts to capture non-propositional fearing: one fears a thing in virtue of believing that it is 
dangerous; one fears a thing in virtue of fearing that the thing will harm one. Of course a 
propositionalist might have other candidates in mind and can be flexible from context to 
context. Nevertheless, looking at these two suggestions will help to illustrate an anti-
propositionalist strategy. 
Image that you are deathly afraid of snakes. The very idea of being around them makes 
you cringe. Further, imagine that a friend is constantly getting wound up around plainly 
harmless dogs and reports that he fears that they will harm him any time he goes out. You ask 
him, ‘Why are you always afraid that these dogs will harm you? They are on leashes, they are 
small, they are sometimes even toothless.’ He responds, ‘I have a fear of dogs. I fear dogs the 
way you fear you snakes. I just can’t help myself. Because I am a dog fearer, I find myself fearing 
that any given dog in my presence will harm me.’ This looks to be a helpful explanation of why 
your friend behaves as he does and indeed explains why he has the propositional fears that he 
has. Moreover, it seems quite plausible that the explanation is a causal one – your friend is 
caused to be in a propositional state by what appears to be a non-propositional state. But now 
suppose, as a propositionalist might suggest, that the fact that he fears dogs obtains in virtue of 
it being the case that he has a fear that dogs will harm him. Our attractive explanation of his 
behavior should now look far less attractive. If what it is to fear dogs is to be in the very 
propositional state we aim to explain, we offer no explanation at all. On the other hand, if the 
position is weaker that a ‘what it is to be’ claim, it still looks like the style of explanation will be 
constitutive or logical and not causal. 
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How might a propositionalist respond? There are two forthcoming ways. First, as noted, 
propositionalists could maintain that there is some other propositional attitude – some other 
fearing-that or some belief or some desire – upon which the non-propositional attitude depends. 
But it looks like we have the makings of a recipe for handling such cases: fix the propositional 
facts upon which non-propositional facts are said to depend and then look for situations in 
which, intuitively, reports of non-propositional liking, fearing, hating, or so on are explanatory 
but which would (if propositionalists were correct) be a mere reiteration of the fact we are 
aiming to explain. It’s worth trying another example to show how this goes. 
Suppose that propositionalists hold that fearing something holds in virtue of believing 
that it is dangerous. What causes me to believe that snakes are dangerous? It’s easy to create a 
case where ‘Because I fear snakes’ seems to be an acceptable and indeed an informative answer. 
If my fearing snakes obtains in virtue of my believing that snakes are dangerous, it’s hard to see 
how this could be so.  
The only way that I can see for propositionalists to avoid this result is to say that context 
systematically gives way to a distinct propositional attitude fact that is explanatory. This strikes 
me as ad hoc if not desperate. 
A second way to reply is to deny that the relevant relationship between, say, fearing dogs 
and fearing that dogs will harm one in the case envisioned above is causal. A propositionalist 
might maintain that we sometimes explain more fundamental facts by citing less fundamental 
facts and this is exactly the kind of explanation your friend is offering you in the dog-scenario.  
This strikes me as a more plausible reply than the first one, but again it seems strained. 
In light of the recipe above, the propositionalist move will be to look for a non-causal 
explanation to satisfy our intuition that an explanation has indeed been offered. But everyone in 
the debate should agree that mental states can cause other mental states. It is very hard for me 
to see why (other than a precommitment to the propositionalist theory) we should think that, in 
any case that follows the recipe, we will have a non-causal explanation on our hands. The 
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contrary seems both possible and indeed likely. My fear of heights causes me to fear that I’ll fall 
from the latter, Mary’s love for her spouse causes her to want well for her spouse, and so on.  
I don’t offer the above as a knock-down argument against the metaphysical approach, 
but at the very least it furthers the burden. Propositionalists not only need to give some account 
of the non-propositional attitude facts, facts such as Bill’s fearing snakes, in propositional 
attitude terms, but they must also recover what look to be causal explanations of behavior and 
action. There is a real worry that they cannot do so when what is being explained is the very kind 




 In the present paper I’ve aimed to clarify and strengthen the anti-propositionalist 
position. I’ve argued that when the thesis is properly understood, anti-propositionalists can and 
should hold that propositional attitudes play important roles in our psychological explanations 
but that non-propositional attitudes have a place as well. The motivations for ridding ourselves 
of non-propositional attitudes are lacking and attempts to explain them away run into serious 
difficulties. We should countenance non-propositional attitudes along side propositional 
attitudes and continue moving forward with positive accounts and applications. 
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